Supreme Court’s decision on deportations gave both the Trump administration and ACLU reasons to claim a victory − but noncitizens clearly lost

A prison officer guards a gate at the Terrorism Confinement Center in El Salvador, where hundreds of migrants from the United States were deported by the Trump administration. Alex Pena/Anadolu via Getty Images

Rebecca Hamlin, UMass Amherst and Paul M. Collins Jr., UMass Amherst

President Donald Trump has claimed victory at the Supreme Court in his campaign to deport Venezuelan migrants accused by the government of being part of a foreign terrorist organization.

“The Supreme Court has upheld the Rule of Law in our Nation by allowing a President, whoever that may be, to be able to secure our Borders, and protect our families and our Country, itself,” Trump posted on April 7, 2025, calling it, “A GREAT DAY FOR JUSTICE IN AMERICA!”

A 5-4 majority of the U.S. Supreme Court had just overruled a lower court that had temporarily barred the deportations, deciding the U.S. could move ahead with its plans to send those Venezuelans to a prison in El Salvador.

Eight minutes after Trump’s post, the American Civil Liberties Union, Democracy Forward and the ACLU of the District of Columbia, three advocacy groups that represented the Venezuelan nationals in the case, also claimed the decision was a win.

In a press release, lawyers from these organizations said that the case was “an important victory” in which the court determined that the “Trump administration acted unlawfully when it removed people from this nation with no process.”

Can both sides legitimately say they won a Supreme Court victory?

As professors of legal studies, we study the Supreme Court, including how the court approaches cases involving immigration law and presidential power.

Here’s why both sides are claiming a win in the case known as Trump v. J.G.G., what the court’s opinion actually said, and what you can take away from it.

The Supreme Court decision lifted the temporary restraining order blocking the deportations imposed by James Boasberg, chief judge of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Drew Angerer/AFP via Getty Images

Why both sides are claiming victory

The complexity of the court’s per curiam opinion – an unsigned opinion of a majority of the court – allows the Trump administration and the ACLU to view the ruling in Trump v. J.G.G. from different perspectives.

This has led them both to claim victory.

Trump sees the case as a win because the justices vacated a lower court decision that had temporarily barred the deportation of the Venezuelans. This means that the federal government was victorious in the case: His administration does not have to immediately stop deporting Venezuelan nationals.

At the same time, the ACLU claims the case is a victory for them because the Supreme Court’s opinion said that the government must give people the opportunity to challenge their removal under the Alien Enemies Act – which the government had not done. The Venezuelans’ right to due process was one of the key arguments advanced by the ACLU and its partners.

On April 9, judges in New York and Texas agreed, just two days after the Supreme Court’s decision, temporarily halting the deportation of five Venezuelans until the government can clarify what type of notice it will be giving to people it intends to deport.

Eventually, the Supreme Court will need to speak definitively about whether the Trump administration can use the Alien Enemies Act to deport those it alleges to be part of a foreign terrorist organization. The court has not yet addressed that issue.

This means the court will have to deal with some tricky questions down the road. These include whether a drug cartel can be said to be engaging in an “invasion” or “predatory incursion” into the United States, which the Alien Enemies Act requires if it is to be invoked. Another issue is the extent to which the Alien Enemies Act can be used when Congress hasn’t declared war.

And a big unanswered question is whether the Supreme Court, or any court, should even answer these questions at all. The political questions doctrine, which dates to 1803, is a principle saying that courts should avoid tackling thorny political questions that are best left to Congress or the president.

Venezuelans deported from the U.S. sit aboard the plane as they arrive at Simon Bolivar International Airport in Maiquetia, Venezuela, on March 28, 2025. Jesus Vargas/picture alliance via Getty Images

What the court decided and what it means for noncitizens’ rights

The court’s brief opinion, to which five members signed on, repeats the very basic constitutional premise that noncitizens are entitled to due process of law, even as they are being removed from the United States. Most significantly, due process includes the ability to protest their deportations before a court of law.

Justice Brett Kavanaugh’s concurrence emphasized the idea that the disagreement between the majority and the dissents is not about whether the noncitizens should have the opportunity to challenge their removal; all nine justices agree they have that right. Rather, Kavanaugh said, the justices disagreed on the question of venue, meaning the location in which these challenges should occur.

Kavanaugh’s focus on venue obscures the fact that what the justices granted to potential deportees is a significantly less robust type of judicial review than the one they were asking for.

The Venezuelans were challenging their removal as a class, because Trump had declared in a presidential proclamation that all Venezuelans over the age of 14 who were believed to be members of the Tren de Aragua cartel “are subject to immediate apprehension, detention, and removal.”

The Supreme Court majority made a group-based approach much more difficult in its April 7 ruling. It allowed for only individual, case-by-case appeals in which each potential deportee must retain legal counsel, file what’s known as a habeas corpus petition challenging their detention, and then try to convince a judge in the district where they are being held that they are not a member of Tren de Aragua in order to prevent their removal.

For most detainees, that would mean filing a petition in the Southern District of Texas, in the 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, known as the most conservative federal circuit in the country.

Unless more courts step in to prevent it, the impact of the decision will be more removals to El Salvador’s notorious CECOT prison, perhaps of people who are not actually gang members, or even Venezuelan. This has already happened in the previous round of removals under this program.

Further, at least 200 people have already been flown out of the U.S. to CECOT. Because they’ve been accused of no crime in El Salvador, they have no right to due process or legal counsel there, and no trial date set where they might prove their innocence. A recent CBS exposé also found that three-quarters of them had no criminal record in the United States either.

In the meantime, there is a separate but related case of a man, Kilmar Abrego Garcia, wrongly deported to El Salvador, despite having legal protection in the U.S. preventing his removal to his home country of El Salvador. The Trump administration is currently arguing before the Supreme Court that when it makes an error in the process of carrying out these removals, it does not have to correct it.

Not all due process is created equal. The court’s April 7 decision allowing the bare minimum process protecting people being removed makes errors more likely and thus raises the stakes for the outcome of the Abrego Garcia case tremendously.

Many parties have claimed victory in the Trump v. J.G.G. decision, but one thing is clear: It was a defeat for the rights of noncitizens in the United States.

Rebecca Hamlin, Professor of Legal Studies and Political Science, UMass Amherst and Paul M. Collins Jr., Professor of Legal Studies and Political Science, UMass Amherst

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. 

As the Kremlin eyes a thaw with the White House, Russia’s pro-war hawks aren’t too happy

Russian President Vladimir Putin attends a wreath-laying ceremony at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Moscow on Feb. 23, 2025. Sergei Bobylyov/AFP via Getty Images

Adam Lenton, Wake Forest University

At face value, the Kremlin has plenty to celebrate after U.S. and Russian officials held high-level bilateral talks on the war in Ukraine for the first time since the full-scale conflict began in 2022.

Russian delegates at the meeting, which took place on Feb. 18 in Saudi Arabia, struck an ebullient tone. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov concluded that “the American side has begun to better understand our position,” while Kirill Dmitriev, the head of Russia’s sovereign wealth fund and an envoy for Moscow, noted that the delegates managed to loosen up enough to laugh and joke. President Vladimir Putin did not attend the meeting, but he characterized it the following day as “very friendly,” going as far as to describe the American delegation as “completely different people” who were “ready to negotiate with an open mind and without any judgment over what was done in the past.”

And the talks are far from the only reason for optimism in Moscow. In statements that echoed Kremlin propaganda, U.S. President Donald Trump blamed Ukraine for being invaded and described Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy as a “dictator.” The U.S. then sided with Russia in two United Nations votes on the conflict and opposed language describing Russia as the aggressor in a draft G7 statement marking the anniversary of the war.

This perceived rapprochement between Washington and Moscow has many critics on both sides of the Atlantic.

Within Russia the reaction has been mixed. And not everybody in Moscow is celebrating the apparent shift in U.S. policy.

Favoring pragmatism

Of course, many Russians would welcome a thaw in relations. In January, Russia’s leading independent polling group found that 61% of Russians favored peace talks over continuing the war in Ukraine – the highest level yet. Meanwhile, the number of web searches for “When will the ‘Special Military Operation’ end?” on Yandex, a Russian tech firm, reached its highest-ever weekly total in the wake of the U.S.-Russia talks.

While public opinion is unlikely to shape the Kremlin’s approach given Putin’s sole control over major foreign policy decisions, evidence suggests that a rapprochement with the United States could also be a boon for Putin at home.

In a recently published article in the peer-reviewed journal International Security, my co-author Henry Hale and I found that while most Russians view the U.S. and NATO as threats, they largely prefer a pragmatic, measured response from the Kremlin – an approach they believed Putin delivered prior to the war in 2022.

High-level summits between Russia and the U.S. have tended to be well received, we found. This is because they tap into a widely held preference for cooperation as well as depicting Russia as a geopolitical “equal” to the U.S.

Pro-war hardliners speak out

Yet not everyone is pleased with the prospect of closer U.S. ties. Russia’s vocal minority of tub-thumping war supporters is already angry.

This loose community of so-called “Z-patriots” – a reference to the large “Z” letters marking Russian military equipment at the beginning of the war – has been a double-edged sword for the Kremlin.

While they have been helpful in mobilizing grassroots support for the war, they have also lambasted Moscow’s execution and made pointed criticisms of top military brass. Such attacks are, in effect, a way of making veiled attacks on Putin himself.

And we are talking about a sizable minority. Estimates indicate that Z-patriots – the more hawkish and ideologically committed segment of war supporters – represent 13% to 27% of the Russian population.

One of this group’s most prominent ideologues, Zakhar Prilepin, didn’t pull any punches in a recent interview. He described as “humiliating” the fact that “the Russian media community, political scientists and politicians are dancing with joy and telling us how wonderful everything is (now that) Trump has arrived.”

There are reasons to take this group seriously. According to Marlène Laruelle, an expert on nationalism and ideology in Russia, the Z-patriots are emerging as key opinion leaders.

Unlike other ideological camps in Russia, the Z-patriots are very much a product of the war, having emerged from the popular military blogging community and with deep connections to paramilitary and veterans organizations. Indeed, many sympathized with former mercenary Wagner Group chief Yevgeny Prigozhin’s anti-elite rants, while Igor Girkin, a former Donbas warlord who claimed to have sparked the initial war in eastern Ukraine in 2014, openly mocked Putin to his almost million-strong Telegram followers.

The Kremlin partially cracked down on some of the Z-patriots in 2023. Prigozhin’s ill-fated mutiny in June was followed by his suspicious death in a plane crash later that summer, while Girkin was jailed and handed a four-year prison sentence for “inciting extremism.”

Yet the Z-patriots remain a force. Girkin, commenting on the U.S.-Russia talks from prison, lamented the “egregious managerial and command failure” over the past three years and sarcastically concluded that Moscow’s political elites, aware of their own weakness, are likely to “‘drag their heels’ in their inimitable style – and with their well-known genius.”

Other pro-war voices expressed skepticism about the information communicated by the Russian delegation and ironically said they expected the Kremlin would pass a law against “discrediting Russia-American relations,” a play on the March 2022 law against “discrediting” Russia’s military.

Sanctions relief a concern

Some of the sharpest criticisms of the Kremlin have been about the economy.

Recent weeks have seen renewed optimism among many in Russia that sanctions relief is on the horizon and that sought-after Western brands may return. Russia – since 2022 the most sanctioned country in the world – had previously appeared to accept that sanctions would remain for decades to come.

The Russian delegation at the recent talks emphasized the prospect of economic cooperation with the United States, no doubt believing Trump to be receptive to such mercantile framings.

A few days later, Putin announced a willingness to develop Russia’s rare earth minerals with foreign partners, including the United States, in what appeared to be an attempt to outbid Zelenskyy.

This, too, provoked a populist backlash among Z-patriots.

“Grampa’s lost it,” one wrote in a thinly veiled swipe at Putin.

Another displayed dismay that “stealing Russia’s natural resources once again became a prospect for mutually beneficial cooperation with American partners.”

“We’ve barely begun to develop small and medium businesses,” Prilepin noted, deriding the “unbearable” excitement around the possibility of Western brands returning.

These sentiments have struck a chord with other parts of society. After all, some Russian businesses have benefited from Western brands’ exit from the Russian market. The government is attempting to fend off these criticisms with a new bill proposed to Russia’s parliament on Feb. 27 calling to ban Western companies that had financially supported Ukraine.

What to do about veterans?

Perhaps most consequential will be what happens to the hundreds of thousands of Russian soldiers currently on the front lines.

While runaway military spending and lavish payouts to soldiers continue to strain the Russian economy, demobilization also poses risks.

A report from the Institute for the Study of War recently concluded that demobilization would be politically risky for the Kremlin, fearful that masses of disgruntled veterans might constitute a potential challenge.

That said, many of the estimated 700,000 Russian troops in Ukraine will eventually return to civilian life and likely become an important constituency in Russian politics moving forward.

The Z-patriots may be a product of war, but they will have an afterlife beyond it. Meanwhile, regardless of any Russian rapprochement with the White House – or perhaps because of it – Russia’s hawks won’t be turning into doves anytime soon.

Adam Lenton, Assistant Professor of Politics & International Affairs, Wake Forest University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. 

How Americans really feel about deporting immigrants – 3 charts explain the conflicting headlines from recent polls

A protest in San Diego against the Trump administration’s mass deportation plan, Jan. 31, 2025. Carlos Moreno/NurPhoto via Getty Images

Leo Gugerty, Clemson University

President Donald Trump’s signature promise during his campaign was to carry out the “largest deportation” operation in U.S. history, targeting all migrants “who violated the law coming into this country.”

Since anyone living in the U.S. without legal permission has broken civil immigration law, Trump would have to deport all of the 11 million to 12 million immigrants living without legal authorization in the U.S., not just people who have committed serious crimes. Most immigrants living in the country illegally have been here longer than 10 years, so many longer-term residents would be deported.

Trump has claimed that his election victory gives him a “powerful mandate” for such actions. But what do the American people really think about mass deportation?

News outlets like CBS and Scripps News have been reporting since mid-2024 that a majority of Americans support Trump’s plans to deport most or all undocumented immigrants.

These stories rely on some polls during 2024 that showed majority support for mass deportation. Meanwhile, other polls in 2024 found public support for deportation below 40%.

I am a psychologist with expertise in survey research and the influence of political ideology on people’s beliefs about news events. And I believe the key to making sense of these conflicting polls lies in understanding the psychological principles that underlie opinion polling.

Conflicting polls

Extensive psychological research research demonstrates that people make better decisions about complex, high-stakes problems when they think about and compare multiple courses of action, instead of narrowing in on one option.

When it comes to deportation, the main policy alternative offered by presidents as far back as George W. Bush has been allowing immigrants to become legal permanent residents if certain conditions are met, like passing a background check.

Because of this, Pew Research, a prominent pollster, suggests that the best way to determine how people feel about issues like mass deportation is to give them a question that forces them to choose between deportation and something else – in this case, legalization.

For example, one July 2024 poll using a “forced-choice” question asked people whether they’d rather see “a way for undocumented immigrants who meet certain requirements … to stay here legally” or “a national effort to deport and remove all illegal immigrants” from the U.S.

Another type of question used by pollsters focuses people’s attention on only one choice by asking them how much they support a policy like deportation, but without mentioning alternatives. Polls that follow this approach ask people’s opinion of deportation in one question, and their opinion of legalization in another.

This is not ideal because research shows it can lead people to exaggerate their support for the named policy.

What the polls say

In total, I found 14 polls conducted during the past eight years that measured Americans’ opinions on both mass deportation and legalizing status. I dropped two from my analysis because they had questions worded in biased language.

The findings from the remaining 12 polls are representative of the diverse demographics of the U.S.

Graph 1 present the results from the eight polls that used a single forced-choice question. I believe these polls give the best picture of how Americans as a group feel about the two immigration policies.

These polls suggest that over the past eight years, Americans’ overall support for mass deportation has increased from around 22% to around 44%. Meanwhile, support for legalizing immigrants’ status has decreased from about 77% to 55%.

However, all four polls conducted in 2024 find support for legalizing status to be above 54% and support for deportation below 45%.

Graph 2 shows the results of the four polls that used separate questions to assess opinions about deportation and legalization.

This chart clearly demonstrates the problem with asking people to rate their support for deportation and legalization in separate questions. Two polls, both taken in the past year – one by Gallup, the other by Times/Siena – found that a majority of respondents supported deportation and that the same group of respondents supported legalization in equal or even greater numbers.

Consider the October 2024 poll where 57% of respondents supported deportation and 57% supported legalization. These percentages add up to more than 100% because many people in the group said they supported both policies. Since mass deportation and general legalization are polar opposites, people who support both policies should not be considered to strongly support either policy.

For this reason, the separate questions technique does not yield good absolute information about the percentage of people who support either deportation or legalization. However, it does give useful relative information like which policy a group supports more and how opinions change over time.

Keeping this in mind, the results of the 12 polls I analyzed indicate that people favored legalizing immigrants’ status over deportation. Eleven polls, including five taken since 2024, showed this pattern. Overall public support for deportation has actually increased since 2016, while support for legalization has decreased.

However, these changes in opinion over time do not hold true for all Americans.

Americans are polarized about immigration

The poll results I’ve discussed so far are averages calculated based on the responses of everyone who responded to the poll. But group averages don’t tell the whole story on any issue – especially when opinions differ widely within a group, as they do with immigration. So let’s look at the results for Republicans and Democrats separately.

Graph 3 breaks down the results by party for the eight polls that used the best practice: forced choice question.

During Trump’s first term, from 2017 to 2020, just over half of Republicans supported legalization; just under half supported deportation. Only within the past year has Republican opinion shifted, with about 70% now supporting deportation.

In contrast, Democrats’ opinions have remained steady for eight years, with about 90% supporting legalization and 10% favoring deportation.

In other words, the apparent shift toward greater support for deportation shown in Graphs 1 and 2 occurred only among Republicans – not for Americans as a whole.

A mandate to legalize

Despite the recent uptick in Republican support for mass deportation, a clear majority of people in the U.S. would rather give undocumented immigrants a path to legal status than have them deported. This has remained true for eight years.

Polls that seem to contradict this conclusion by showing majority support for mass deportation have used the less reliable separate-questions technique. These results are questionable because these poll respondents voiced equal or stronger support for legalizing immigrants’ status.

If Trump has a “powerful mandate” on immigration, my research shows, it’s for getting legal authorization for immigrants who’ve lived in the U.S. a long time without it – not deporting them.

Leo Gugerty, Professor Emeritus in Psychology, Clemson University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license.

Candidate experience matters in elections, but not the way you think

Previously holding political office is an obvious advantage for candidates seeking votes. SDI Productions/E+/Getty Images

Charlie Hunt, Boise State University

Ever since he was chosen as Donald Trump’s running mate back in July, U.S. Sen. JD Vance, a Republican from Ohio, has come under a level of scrutiny typical for a vice presidential candidate, including for some of his eyebrow-raising public statements made in the past or during the campaign.

One line of critique has persisted through the news cycles: that his lack of political experience may make Vance less qualified than others, including his opponent, Gov. Tim Walz of Minnesota, to be vice president.

Do more politically experienced politicians have advantages in elections? And if they enjoyed such advantages in the past, do they still in such a polarized political moment?

The answers are complicated, but political science offers some clues.

Why experience should matter

Previously holding political office, and for a longer period of time, is in some ways an obvious advantage for candidates making the case to potential voters. If you were applying for a job as an attorney, previous legal experience would be favorably looked upon by an employer. The same is true in elections: If you want to run for office, experience as an officeholder could help you perform better at the job you’re asking for.

This approach has been taken by a number of high-profile politicians over the years. For example, in Hillary Clinton’s first campaign for president in 2008, the U.S. senator from New York and future secretary of state made “strength and experience” the centerpiece of her argument to the voters.

Experience also might matter for the same reasons as incumbency – that is, when a candidate is currently holding the office they are seeking in an election. Incumbents typically have much higher name recognition than their challenger opponents, distinct fundraising advantages and, at least in theory, a record of policy achievement on which to base their campaigns. Even for nonincumbents, these advantages are more prevalent for previous officeholders rather than someone who is a newcomer to politics.

Barack Obama and his family on Nov. 4, 2008, the day he won the presidential election, showing that a lack of political experience can be used as a benefit. Emmanuel Dunand/AFP via Getty Images

Inexperienced, or an ‘outsider’?

But Hillary Clinton was, of course, unsuccessful in her first bid for the Democratic presidential nomination in 2008. She was beaten by a relatively inexperienced candidate named Barack Obama; like Vance, Obama had served less than a full term in the Senate before running for higher office.

Obama’s 2008 win shows that a lack of political experience can be leveraged as a benefit.

One of the few things Obama and Donald Trump have in common is that both benefited from an appeal to voters as a political “outsider” in elections in which Americans were frustrated with the political status quo. As outsiders, they appeared uniquely positioned to fix what voters believed was wrong with politics.

Does experience equal ‘quality’?

The “outsider” label isn’t always a ticket to victory.

In 2020, for example, voters were frustrated with the chaos of having a political outsider in the White House and turned to Joe Biden – possibly the most experienced presidential candidate in modern history at that point, with eight years as vice president and several decades in the Senate under his belt. Voters were hungry for political normalcy in the White House and made that choice for Biden.

Does U.S. Sen. JD Vance’s lack of political experience make him less qualified than his opponent, Gov. Tim Walz of Minnesota, to be vice president? Scott Olson/Getty Images

Political science has other important lessons about when experience matters and when it doesn’t. In Congress, electoral challengers – those running against incumbents – enjoy more of a boost from prior experience in places such as the state legislature. In fact, the typical indicator for challenger “quality” used in political science research is a simple marker of whether the challenger has prior political experience.

But even this finding is more complicated than it seems: Political scientists such as Jeffrey Lazarus have found that high-quality – that is, politically experienced – challengers do better in part because they are more strategic in waiting for better opportunities to run in winnable races.

Experience matters only sometimes – and maybe less than ever

The usefulness of a lengthy political resume also depends on which stage of the election candidates are in.

Research has found, for example, that a candidate’s experience matters much more in settings such as party primaries, where differences between the candidates on policy issues are typically much narrower. That leaves nonpolicy differences such as experience to play a bigger role.

In the general election, voters supportive of one party are unlikely to factor candidate experience in that heavily, even, or especially, when the candidate they support lacks it.

The political science phenomenon known as negative partisanship means that, more and more, voters are motivated not by positive attributes of their own party’s candidates but rather by the fear of losing to the other side. This has only been exacerbated as the two parties have polarized further.

Voters are therefore more willing than ever to lower the standards they might have for their favored candidates’ resumes if it means beating the other side. Even if a Democrat is clearly more qualified than a Republican in terms of political experience, that advantage is unlikely to sway many Republican voters, and vice versa.

What about 2024?

In 2024, the experience factor is complicated. Trump, of course, has been president before – the ultimate prior experience for someone running for exactly that office.

But he has continued to run as an outsider from the political establishment, casting Kamala Harris – who, as vice president, has little actual institutional power – as an incumbent who is responsible for the current state of the country. Since polls show consistently that a majority of Americans believe the country is not headed in the right direction, we can see why Trump might try to frame the race in this way.

Whether Trump’s strategy ends up working will be more apparent after the election is over. For now, Trump and Harris can rest assured that most of their supporters don’t appear to care how much – or how little – experience they have.

Charlie Hunt, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Boise State University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. 

In a new era of campus upheaval, the 1970 Kent State shootings show the danger of deploying troops to crush legal protests

Ohio National Guard soldiers move in on war protesters at Kent State University on May 4, 1970. AP Photo

Brian VanDeMark, United States Naval Academy

Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump has expressed his intention, if elected to a second term, to use the U.S. armed forces to suppress domestic protests. The New York Times reports that Trump’s allies are marshaling legal arguments to justify using National Guard or active-duty military troops for crowd control.

Moreover, as the Times notes, Trump has asserted that if he returns to the White House, he will dispatch such forces without waiting for state or local officials to request such assistance.

I am a historian who has written several books about the Vietnam War, one of the most divisive episodes in our nation’s past. My new book, “Kent State: An American Tragedy,” examines a historic clash on May 4, 1970, between anti-war protesters and National Guard troops at Kent State University in Ohio.

The confrontation escalated into violence: Troops opened fire on the demonstrators, killing four students and wounding nine others, including one who was paralyzed for life.

In my view, the prospect of dispatching troops in the way that Trump proposes chillingly echoes actions that led up to the Kent State shootings. Some active-duty units, as well as National Guard troops, are trained today to respond to riots and violent protests – but their primary mission is still to fight, kill, and win wars.

Archival footage from CBS News of the clash between campus anti-war protesters and Ohio National Guard troops at Kent State University on May 4, 1970.

Federalizing the Guard

The National Guard is a force of state militias under the command of governors. It can be federalized by the president during times of national emergency or for deployment on combat missions overseas. Guardsmen train for one weekend per month and two weeks every summer.

Typically, the Guard has been deployed to deal with natural disasters and support local police responses to urban unrest, such as riots in Detroit in 1967, Washington in 1968, Los Angeles in 1965 and 1992, and Minneapolis and other cities in 2020 after the death of George Floyd.

The 1807 Insurrection Act grants presidents authority to use active-duty troops or National Guard forces to restore order within the United States. However, presidents rarely deploy Guard troops without state governors’ consent.

The main modern exceptions occurred during the Civil Rights Movement, when Southern governors resisted federal orders to desegregate schools in Arkansas, Mississippi and Alabama. In each case, the troops were sent to protect Black students from crowds of white protesters.

The standoff at Kent State

The war in Vietnam had grown increasingly unpopular by early 1970, but protests intensified on April 30 when President Richard Nixon authorized expanding the conflict into Cambodia. At Kent State, after a noontime anti-war rally on campus on May 1, alcohol-fueled students harassed passing motorists in town and smashed storefront windows that night. On May 2, anti-war protesters set fire to the building where military officers trained Kent State students enrolled in the armed forces’ Reserve Officer Training Corps program.

In response, Republican Gov. Jim Rhodes dispatched National Guard troops, against the advice of university and many local officials, who understood the mood in the town of Kent and on campus far better than Rhodes did. County prosecutor Ron Kane had vehemently warned Rhodes that deploying the National Guard could spark conflict and lead to fatalities.

Nonetheless, Rhodes – who was trailing in an impending Republican primary for a U.S. Senate seat – struck the pose of a take-charge leader who wasn’t going to be pushed around by a long-haired rabble. “We’re going to put a stop to this!” he shouted, pounding the table at a press conference in Kent on May 3.

Hundreds of National Guard troops were deployed across town and on campus. University officials announced that further rallies were banned. Nonetheless, on May 4, some 2,000 to 3,000 students gathered on the campus Commons for another anti-war rally. They were met by 96 National Guardsmen, led by eight officers.

There was an edge of confrontation in the air as student anger over Nixon’s expansion of the war blended with resentment over the Guard’s presence. Protesters chanted antiwar slogans, shouted epithets at the Guardsmen and made obscene gestures.

Doug Guthrie, a student at Kent State in 1970, looks back 54 years later at the events of May 4.

‘Fire in the air!’

The Guardsmen sent to Kent State had no training in de-escalating tension or minimizing the use of force. Nonetheless, their commanding officer that day, Ohio Army National Guard Assistant Adjutant General Robert Canterbury, decided to use them to break up what the Department of Justice later deemed a legal assembly.

In my view, it was a reckless judgment that inflamed an already volatile situation. Students started showering the greatly outnumbered Guardsmen with rocks and other objects. In violation of Ohio Army National Guard regulations, Canterbury neglected to warn the students that the Guardsmens’ rifles were loaded with live ammunition.

As tension mounted, Canterbury failed to adequately supervise his increasingly fearful troops – a cardinal responsibility of the commanding officer on the scene. This fundamental failure of leadership increased confusion and resulted in a breakdown of fire control discipline – officers’ responsibility to maintain tight control over their troops’ discharge of weapons.

When protesters neared the Guardsmen, platoon sergeant Mathew McManus shouted “Fire in the air!” in a desperate attempt to prevent bloodshed. McManus intended for troops to shoot above the students’ heads to warn them off. But some Guardsmen, wearing gas masks that made it hard to hear amid the noise and confusion, only heard or reacted to the first word of McManus’ order, and fired at the students.

The troops had not been trained to fire warning shots, which was contrary to National Guard regulations. And McManus had no authority to issue an order to fire if officers were nearby, as they were.

Many National Guardsmen who were at Kent State on May 4 later questioned why they had been deployed there. “Loaded rifles and fixed bayonets are pretty harsh solutions for students exercising free speech on an American campus,” one of them told an oral history interviewer. Another plaintively asked me in a 2023 interview, “Why would you put soldiers trained to kill on a university campus to serve a police function?”

A fighting force

National Guard equipment and training have improved significantly in the decades since Kent State. But Guardsmen are still troops who are fundamentally trained to fight, not to control crowds. In 2020, then-National Guard Bureau Chief General Joseph Lengyel told reporters that “the civil unrest mission is one of the most difficult and dangerous missions … in our domestic portfolio.”

In my view, the tragedy of Kent State shows how critical it is for authorities to be thoughtful in responding to protests, and extremely cautious in deploying military troops to deal with them. Force is inherently unpredictable, often uncontrollable, and can lead to fatal mistakes and lasting human suffering. And while protests sometimes break rules, they may not be disruptive or harmful enough to merit responding with force.

Aggressive displays of force often heighten tensions and worsen situations. Conversely, research shows that if protesters perceive authorities are behaving with restraint and treating them with respect, they are more likely to remain nonviolent. The shooting at Kent State demonstrates why force should be an absolute last resort in dealing with protests – and one fraught with grave risks.

Brian VanDeMark, Professor of History, United States Naval Academy

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. 

SpaceX’s Elon Musk endorsed Donald Trump for president – what this could mean for US space policy

Elon Musk’s ties with Donald Trump could affect how the former president would approach U.S. space policy. Saul Martinez via Getty Images

Svetla Ben-Itzhak, Johns Hopkins University

Elon Musk officially endorsed Donald Trump for president of the United States on July 13, 2024, shortly after Trump survived an assassination attempt. Musk, a billionaire technology entrepreneur, has made groundbreaking contributions in multiple industries, particularly space travel and exploration.

Even before Musk’s endorsement, Trump was reportedly considering giving the billionaire an advisory role if elected for a second term. With Musk’s public support and financial backing, it now seems even more likely that Trump would offer him an official position in his administration.

As someone who studies space and international relations, I am interested in how Musk might influence U.S. space policy if Trump wins in November. Their partnership could significantly shape the future of U.S. space exploration and defense, as well as shift the balance of power between the public and private sectors in space.

Current US space policy

A nation’s space policy reflects its vision and priorities for outer space. U.S. space policy – a mix of continuity from past administrations and recent directives – is outlined in key documents, including the U.S. National Space Policy, the U.S. Space Priorities Framework, Space Policy Directives and other official publications.

Current space policy emphasizes maintaining U.S. leadership in space, protecting U.S. space assets and working with commercial and international partners to promote safe, secure and responsible behavior in space. Its key elements include growing the American commercial space sector and returning astronauts to the Moon.

Musk’s company SpaceX has been instrumental in advancing these goals, supporting both NASA and the U.S. Space Force – the newest branch of the U.S. military – in their missions. SpaceX’s innovations, such as the reusable Falcon 9 rockets, the Starlink satellite internet and the powerful Starship, have dramatically transformed access to and use of outer space.

The 2016-2020 Trump administration advanced many of the current U.S. space policy goals, some of which closely align with Musk’s own ambitions for space.

Space synergy: Trump’s and Musk’s shared ambitions

Trump and Musk agree on three main objectives in space.

First, both are committed to human expansion beyond Earth. Trump’s Space Policy Directive 1, signed on Dec. 11, 2017, set the U.S. on a course to return astronauts to the Moon and establish a permanent presence there, followed by human missions to Mars and beyond.

This directive aligns with Musk’s vision of colonizing Mars, which is guiding the development of Starship: the most powerful and massive spacecraft ever built. Designed to be fully reusable, Starship will carry large payloads and be capable of deep space travel – including lunar landings and journeys to the red planet.

SpaceX tested its Starship rocket for a fourth time in July 2024. AP Photo/Eric Gay

NASA’s Artemis program, which originated from Trump’s Space Policy Directive 1, plans to return humans to the Moon by 2026. To achieve this goal, NASA partnered with SpaceX in 2021 to develop the Starship Human Landing System spacecraft, which will transport astronauts and cargo from lunar orbit to the Moon’s surface and back.

NASA’s Artemis program plans to return humans to the Moon by 2026.

Second, both Trump and Musk support commercial involvement in space. Trump’s Space Policy Directive 1 specifically calls for commercial and international partnerships, marking a shift from the previous administration. President Joe Biden has continued this push to develop a robust commercial U.S. space sector.

This recognition of the pivotal role that private industries can play in space exploration aligns with Musk’s record as an entrepreneur and innovator. Under Musk, SpaceX has not only provided essential services to NASA, but it has also driven innovation to new heights. The company has significantly lowered the cost of space ventures and made space more accessible to a broader audience of space explorers.

Third, both favor deregulation. Trump’s administration sought to reduce regulatory barriers through directives like his Space Policy Directive 2, which aimed to streamline commercial space regulations to encourage faster growth and innovation in the private space industry.

Even so, Musk has often found existing space regulations too restrictive. He has frequently challenged U.S. regulators – such as the Federal Aviation Administration which oversees launch and reentry requirements – and has called for “comprehensive deregulation.”

Contrasting space visions: Musk vs. Trump

In terms of space priorities, Musk differs from Trump in three main aspects.

First, Musk is focused on the long-term goal of making humanity a multi-planetary species, starting with colonizing Mars and establishing a self-sustaining human presence there.

In contrast, Trump’s approach to space emphasized asserting U.S. leadership by achieving near-Earth and near-term milestones, like returning Americans to the Moon. Consequently, during his presidency, Trump prioritized the Artemis program and launched the Space Force to safeguard U.S. capabilities in space.

Second, while both value the private sector, Musk, through SpaceX, has pushed for cost reduction, innovation and rapid iteration in space technology. SpaceX’s Falcon rockets have reflown some 300 times, significantly cutting spaceflight costs. SpaceX also achieved major milestones in commercial spaceflight, including becoming the first private company to send astronauts to the International Space Station.

In contrast, to fund the Artemis program, Trump called for a significant increase in NASA’s budget. This move emphasized investing in government-led programs to achieve space objectives.

Third, Musk appears more open to sharing patented information, even with his competitors. He famously stated that “patents are for the weak,” arguing that they block innovation and stifle progress. While Musk continues to patent inventions, including those related to SpaceX, he has also expressed support for fostering innovation through openness and collaboration.

In contrast, Trump’s space policy focused on national security and strategic competition. The creation of the Space Force reflected Trump’s view of space as a contested, military domain where the U.S. must protect its assets and maintain a competitive advantage.

Musk’s likely impact on future US space policy

If Musk were to take on a larger, formal role in a second Trump administration, he would likely push for ambitious space missions and timelines. The initial focus would continue to be on the Artemis program and lunar settlements, with increased attention eventually shifting to human missions to Mars and beyond.

Donald Trump and Elon Musk chat at the White House in 2017. Brendan Smialowski/AFP via Getty Images

A Trump-Musk partnership would likely further advance the commercialization of space. Musk could advocate for more deregulation of space activities, potentially challenging existing safety and security standards. While Musk is also likely to push for cost reduction, innovation and efficiency, it would be interesting to see how his efforts would fare against government bureaucracy.

Whether Musk would affect U.S. space policy regarding international competitors like China remains uncertain. Musk’s presence in a second Trump administration could, however, shed light on whether commercial space actors can help decrease tensions between countries in space.

Musk is not a politician. He is a visionary and problem solver focused on the future of humanity. These qualities are also most likely to shape his impact on U.S. space policy.

Svetla Ben-Itzhak, Assistant Professor of Space and International Relations, Johns Hopkins University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. 

Supreme Court makes prosecution of Trump on obstruction charge more difficult, with ruling to narrowly define law used against him and Jan. 6 rioters

The Supreme Court faced a decision in a case involving participants in the Jan. 6, 2021, U.S. Capitol riot. AP Photo/John Minchillo, File

Riley T. Keenan, University of Richmond

The indictments – and in some cases, the convictions – of hundreds of people charged with participating in the riot at the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6, 2021, will have to be reconsidered, and possibly dropped, because of a ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court on June 28, 2024. Among those charged using a broad interpretation of the obstruction law now narrowed by the high court: former President Donald Trump.

In its decision in Fischer v. United States, the Supreme Court held that a federal statute that prohibits obstructing an official proceeding may not apply to three defendants who were charged with participating in the U.S. Capitol riot. Although former President Donald Trump is not a defendant in the case, special counsel Jack Smith has charged him separately with violating the same statute.

As a law professor who teaches and writes in the fields of constitutional law and federal courts, I’ll explain what the court’s decision means for Jan. 6 defendants – and for Smith’s case against Trump.

Charges against Capitol rioters

According to their indictments, Joseph Fischer, Edward Lang and Garret Miller were present at the Capitol on Jan. 6, 2021. Prosecutors say that all three men entered the Capitol building and assaulted police officers during the riot. One of the men, Lang, brandished a bat and a stolen police shield, and another, Miller, later called for the assassination of U.S. Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez on social media.

Federal prosecutors charged the three men with various crimes, including assault on a federal officer, disorderly conduct on the Capitol grounds and obstructing a congressional proceeding. That last charge is the one at issue in the Supreme Court appeal.

Before trial, the defendants argued that the law the prosecutors had used to charge them with obstruction applied only to evidence tampering, not the violent disruption of a congressional proceeding. The district court agreed and dismissed the charge, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed and sent the case back for trial.

The Supreme Court then agreed to hear the case, putting the trial on hold while it considered the dispute over the scope of the obstruction law.

Defining a catch-all term

In a 6-3 opinion by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Supreme Court agreed with the defendants and held that the statute prohibits only evidence tampering. It then sent the case back to the appeals court to decide whether the defendants violated the law under that narrower reading by trying to prevent Congress from receiving and certifying the states’ true electoral votes.

The court began with the text of the obstruction law. The law penalizes anyone who “alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, document, or other object” or who “otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding.” The government argued that the defendants had “otherwise obstruct(ed)” proceedings in Congress to certify the results of the 2020 election.

But the court rejected that argument, holding that the phrase “otherwise obstructs” refers only to obstruction that – like altering, destroying, mutilating or concealing a record, document or object – impairs the availability or integrity of evidence for use in an official proceeding. The law’s catch-all for “otherwise obstructing” an official proceeding must be read in common with the list of actions that precedes it, the court explained. Otherwise, the list would be redundant.

The court also pointed to the law’s historical background. Congress, the court explained, enacted this specific obstruction law in 2002 in the wake of the Enron accounting fraud scandal. Its aim was to fill a gap in the nation’s existing obstruction laws, which at the time prohibited directing a third party to destroy incriminating evidence but not destroying the evidence oneself.

The government’s reading of the law, the court explained, would stretch it far beyond that purpose, prohibiting forms of obstruction that had nothing to do with evidence and that Congress never intended to criminalize.

What this means for Jan. 6 defendants – and for Trump

The Supreme Court, from left in front row: Sonia Sotomayor, Clarence Thomas, John Roberts, Samuel Alito and Elena Kagan; and from left in back row: Amy Coney Barrett, Neil Gorsuch, Brett Kavanaugh and Ketanji Brown Jackson. Alex Wong/Getty Images

The Supreme Court’s decision does not end the case against the Fischer defendants, who will likely stand trial on their assault and disorderly conduct charges.

But it may lead to the dismissal of obstruction charges, or reversal of obstruction convictions, for other Jan. 6 defendants. According to an NPR database, federal prosecutors have charged at least 250 other defendants with obstruction of an official proceeding, and 128 have been convicted.

The ruling may also undermine special counsel Jack Smith’s case against former President Donald Trump, whom Smith has charged with obstruction under the same law. If that case survives a separate pending Supreme Court appeal, the former president will likely seek dismissal of that charge.

Trump may not succeed, however, as the obstruction charge against him is based in part on the allegation that he organized slates of electors to certify false election results to Congress. That may amount to impairing the integrity of the evidence used in the certification proceedings.

And the obstruction charge is also not the only count the former president faces. But the ruling may narrow the case and make it more difficult for the special counsel to present evidence to the jury concerning the violence that occurred on Jan. 6. Under this new ruling, that violence alone may not count as obstruction.

The Fischer case also shows how sometimes, especially in high-stakes cases, the justices can use methods of legal reasoning that they are quick to criticize in other contexts. In the opinion, members of the Supreme Court’s conservative majority cited the legislative history of the obstruction law – evidence that conservative jurists such as the late Justice Antonin Scalia often called unreliable.

The Supreme Court’s decision in the Fischer case may have a profound effect on the special counsel’s historic prosecution of former President Trump.

But even if it does not, it still sheds important light on the court’s inner workings and the federal government’s power to safeguard the integrity of its proceedings.

Riley T. Keenan, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Richmond

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. 

A campaign-defining presidential debate

U.S. President Joe Biden and Donald Trump participate in the CNN Presidential Debate on June 27, 2024. Justin Sullivan/Getty Images

Mary Kate Cary, University of Virginia and Karrin Vasby Anderson, Colorado State University

With four months to go until Election Day, the earliest-ever general election debate featured two presidents – one current, one former – and a lot of bitter personal attacks. Joe Biden’s universally acknowledged poor performance surprised and even panicked Democrats; Donald Trump gave a more forceful – if not truthful – performance.

The Conversation asked two scholars, Mary Kate Cary and Karrin Vasby Anderson, to watch the debate and analyze a passage or a moment that stood out to them. Anderson is a communications scholar with a specialty in gender and the presidency, as well as political pop culture. Cary teaches political speechwriting and worked as a White House speechwriter for President George H.W. Bush, for whom she wrote more than 100 addresses.

President Joe Biden speaks during the CNN debate against Donald Trump on June 27, 2024, in Atlanta. Justin Sullivan/Getty Images

Karrin Vasby Anderson, Colorado State University Department of Communication Studies

One of the first definitions of good public speaking I learned as a college debater and student of rhetoric came from the ancient Roman scholar and rhetoric teacher Quintilian. In his 12-volume “Institutio Oratoria,” Quintilian said the ideal orator was a good person, speaking well. He was particularly concerned about the danger that a skilled rhetorician who lacked character could pose to society.

A presidential debate ought to showcase ideal orators – skilled speakers who are also people of character. The June 27 debate offered voters an either-or scenario.

Former President Donald Trump was aggressive, confident and disciplined, but he peppered his remarks with a steady stream of lies, half-truths and misinformation. President Joe Biden focused on Trump’s documented record – both criminal and political – but failed as an orator, demonstrating none of the charisma and command on display during his most recent State of the Union address just four months ago.

The contrast was clear early in the debate when CNN’s Dana Bash asked Trump whether he would block access to abortion medication. Trump said that he would not. He then falsely claimed that, in the lead-up to the 2022 Supreme Court decision that overturned Roe v. Wade and removed the federal protection for abortion rights, “everybody wanted to get it back to the states, everybody, without exception.”

Trump then went on offense, accusing Democrats of taking “the life of a child in the eighth month, ninth month, even after birth.”

Biden’s response was initially clear and resolute: “It’s been a terrible thing, what you’ve done,” he said. And he pushed back against the preposterous claim that “everybody” wanted Roe v. Wade overturned, saying, “the idea that states are able to do this is a little like saying we’re going to turn civil rights back to the states (and) let each state have a different rule.”

But the rest of Biden’s response was muddled. After “veering inexplicably” into an anecdote about a woman murdered by an undocumented immigrant, Biden expressed his support for people’s right to choose by saying on three separate occasions that the decision should be up to a doctor, rather than the pregnant person.

Trump closed out the segment by reiterating his blatant lie in stronger terms: “So that means, he can take the life of the baby, in the ninth month and even after birth because some states, Democrat run, take it after birth.” The Associated Press’s fact check of this claim is succinct: “Infanticide is criminalized in every state, and no state has passed a law that allows killing a baby after birth.”

After nearly a decade of exposure to Trump’s habitual misinformation, lies about states murdering babies may not stand out as shocking in a presidential debate. And, certainly, it’s an argument that should have been easy for Biden to refute.

But if the populace must choose between a good person and someone who spoke well, Quintilian would remind us that someone who speaks well but has no integrity is dangerous.

The consequences for the republic could be dire.

Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump answers a question during the first debate of the 2024 U.S. presidential election. Justin Sullivan/Getty Images

Mary Kate Cary, University of Virginia Department of Politics

I think America just saw history being made.

Within 10 minutes, a very hoarse President Joe Biden, was asked about deficit spending, lost his train of thought, and ended his answer by muttering something about “beating Medicare.” It was awful.

There were so many moments when Biden looked confused and unable to process what was happening. I took notes on key exchanges, but the number of embarrassing episodes, unfinished sentences and incoherent phrases by Biden is too long to list. His answer on why he should be president in his 80s somehow veered into computer chips being made in South Korea.

Former President Donald Trump made his own share of missteps, but overall, he was relatively sharp, and restrained when he was provoked. He scored some points on the issues and did much better than he did in their first debate four years ago. Trump did better than I think many people thought he would.

Our assignment tonight was to find a moment to react to and put it in context. I’ve been to multiple presidential debates and watched many more on television over the years, and have never seen anything like this.

Is there any way the Democrats can convincingly argue for keeping Biden as their nominee?

The bottom line: Moderators Jake Tapper and Dana Bash did a good job of asking substantive questions and keeping control of the debate; Trump missed an opportunity to knock it out of the park but got through it; and Biden will most likely have caused a disaster for the Democratic Party.

Mary Kate Cary, Adjunct Professor of Politics and Director of Think Again, University of Virginia and Karrin Vasby Anderson, Professor of Communication Studies, Colorado State University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license.